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Abstract
Parties in advanced democracies take ideological positions as part of electoral competition, but some
parties communicate their position more clearly than others. Existing research on democratic party
competition has paid much attention to assessing partisan position-taking in electoral manifestos,
but it has largely overlooked how the clarity of position is reflected in manifestos. We present a
scaling procedure that better reflects the data generating process of party manifestos. Our new
estimator allows us to recover not only positional estimates, but also estimates for the ideological
clarity or ambiguity of parties. We validate our results via Monte Carlo tests, a manifesto drafting
simulation, and a human coding exercise. Finally, we apply our estimator to party manifestos in
four multiparty democracies and demonstrate that sending ambiguous ideological signals can be
an electorally successful strategy when combined with moderating the overall ideological stance of
the party.
1 Introduction
Parties offer policy alternatives to voters as part of electoral competition, but vary in how they commu-
nicate their policy positions to the electorate. Parties may present voters with a clear message, or they
may offer a program that conveys a variety of viewpoints, possibly muddying its ideological content.
This ambiguity may arise in a party’s program for a variety of reasons. Conflicting ideological views may
exist within the party leadership, who must then determine how best to accommodate differing opinions
in the party program. Alternatively, the party may attempt to attract a wide array of voters by pitching
different, and possibly incompatible messages to different electoral audiences. Lastly, new parties may
need to learn which messages resonate best with their voters, and they may attempt different pitches
before settling on a message that works. Regardless of the underlying reason, parties face choices over
how to represent their programs to the public when multiple viewpoints exist. Much recent work has
used election manifestos — documents written by parties at the start of an election campaign expressing
a core platform — to estimate party positions. But few studies explicitly acknowledge that parties must
aggregate various policy proposals into a single document. We argue that we can learn about the clarity
or ambiguity of the party message, in addition to the party’s overall ideological position, by examining
party manifestos.
We introduce a theory of party manifesto drafting in which parties put forward a single electoral
platform to signal a policy program to voters and other parties. Parties draft a document containing an
ideological position and some latent level of ambiguity around that position; they may include multiple,
perhaps conflicting, statements on an issue, or they may remain vague, or even silent. Regardless
of whether ambiguity represents a strategic choice by party leaders to attract voters or results from
intra-party pressures, we argue that as the lack of ideological clarity grows, the language parties use to
communicate party positions in their program displays greater variance. We model this variation within
manifesto texts to estimate the latent ambiguity of a party’s position. Our new estimates of ideological
ambiguity allow us to study the effects of positional clarity on parties’ electoral success.
Our findings contribute to at least three distinct literatures. First, our approach speaks to the
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comparative parties literature which increasingly relaxes the party-as-a-unitary-actor assumption to
examine phenomena such as party factions (e.g. Budge, Ezrow and McDonald, 2010), party switching
(e.g. Heller and Mershon, 2008), and roll call vote defections (e.g. Carey, 2009; Kam, 2009). Second,
we contribute to the growing literature on the role of ambiguity (Dewan and Myatt, 2008; Tomz and
Van Houweling, 2009; Somer-Topcu, 2013) and party positioning in electoral competition (e.g. Bawn
and Somer-Topcu, 2012; Ezrow, 2005, 2010; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009). And third, our approach
speaks to the literature using text as data to estimate latent variables in political science (e.g. Diermeier
et al., 2012; Grimmer, 2010; Hopkins and King, 2010; Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Quinn et al., 2010;
Spirling, 2011). We specifically argue that the models underpinning political text analysis can greatly
benefit from incorporating substantive information about the data-generating process behind the text
under investigation.
We begin by presenting a theory of manifesto drafting, and we then derive a scaling model of
text that jointly estimates latent document positions and ambiguity from manifestos. The properties
of our estimator are tested through Monte Carlo simulations, demonstrating that our model recovers
both position and clarity parameter values when our distributional assumptions hold. To evaluate the
validity of our estimates, we first simulate the manifesto drafting process on the basis of our theoretical
model. We draft documents that are set a priori to have a certain level of ambiguity, and show that
the scaling model successfully recovers differences in ambiguity. Second, we demonstrate that human
coders correctly perceive the level of ambiguity in our manufactured statements through a text coding
exercise. Third, we apply our estimator to party manifestos in Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and
Sweden. And lastly, we use our position and ambiguity estimates as independent variables to explain
parties’ electoral success. We find that moves away from the ideological center hurt a party electorally
as its position become more ambiguous, but lead to electoral gains when coupled with greater ideological
clarity.
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2 Intra-party Politics, Manifesto Drafting, and Electoral Competition
Scholars of political parties have long noted the importance of accounting for internal party organization
to understand party competition (e.g. Duverger, 1963; Sartori, 2005), but empirical and theoretical work
on party competition, coalition formation, and policy-making has tended to treat parties as unitary
actors (e.g. Downs, 1957; Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Tsebelis, 2002). While recent work on comparative
legislative and electoral behavior has relaxed the unitary actor assumption (e.g. Budge, Ezrow and
McDonald, 2010; Heller and Mershon, 2008; Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Tavits, 2009, 2011), work on
estimating positions from election manifestos has not emphasized the fact that the content of policy
programs is the result of meshing different, and often competing, views (e.g. Gabel and Huber, 2000;
Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Klingemann et al., 2006). Extant measures of party positions largely
overlook the degree of policy ambiguity in these positions. Empirically, manifestos are treated as
documents reflecting clearly defined policy positions, either through the application of a manual policy
coding scheme as applied by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987;
Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006) or through automated techniques (Laver, Benoit and Garry,
2003; Lowe, 2008; Slapin and Proksch, 2008). To the extent that existing methods capture ambiguity,
they do so indirectly by reporting uncertainty around the position estimate, highlighting document
length, or comparing parties in and out of government (Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov, 2009; Gabel and
Huber, 2000; Marks et al., 2007). While it has become standard to report estimates of uncertainty
around measures of party positions derived from manifestos (Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov, 2009; Laver,
Benoit and Garry, 2003; Lowe et al., 2011; Slapin and Proksch, 2008), this uncertainty need not just be
due to ambiguity; rather it could be due to other features of a stochastic text generation model (Benoit,
Laver and Mikhaylov, 2009).
While the empirical literature on manifestos rarely considers the clarity of parties’ ideological po-
sitions, a large body of literature, both empirical and theoretical, suggests that level of ambiguity
surrounding party and candidate positions has important consequences for party politics and electoral
competition. For example, formal models of leadership suggest the ability to communicate clearly is
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important in determining leaders’ influence over followers (Dewan and Myatt, 2008). Moreover, much
of the literature on electoral competition and campaigns suggests that policy ambiguity can affect
voter support for a party or candidate (e.g. Shepsle, 1972; Page, 1976; Campbell, 1983; Tomz and Van
Houweling, 2009; Somer-Topcu, 2013). However, the direction of the effect of position ambiguity on
voter support remains clear, and relationships are often highly contingent. For example, in the Ameri-
can context, Campbell finds that the effects of ambiguity vary with issue salience and popular support
for a given policy, while Tomz & Van Houweling find that its effect is contingent on partisanship. While
recent studies examine how shifts in policy positions affect party support in multiparty democracy (e.g.
Ezrow, 2005; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Kalandrakis and Spirling, 2011; Bawn and Somer-Topcu,
2012), almost no study examines how the ambiguity of party positions interact with position-taking to
affect electoral outcomes in multiparty democracies.1
The remainder of the paper assumes that the manner in which manifestos are drafted should affect the
type of signal they send to voters and parties. We provide a theory of the data generating process behind
election manifestos which enables researchers to leverage the variation in word usage they contain. Our
theory suggests that we can estimate policy ambiguity as well as policy positions from these documents.
If parties remain ambiguous or silent on issues, then the documents contain additional variation in word
usage that a single estimated position cannot capture. After examining the validity of our estimates,
we use them to evaluate theories of electoral politics that account for both policy position and policy
ambiguity.
3 A Theory of Manifesto Drafting
How do parties draft manifestos? Conventional wisdom suggests that “politically sophisticated party
elites [draft manifestos] with many different objectives in mind” (Laver and Garry, 2000, p.620). Yet,
there are few common procedures that govern how parties arrive at the final draft. We may find
variation in drafting procedures across party systems (e.g. the manifesto tradition is quite different
in the UK compared with Japan, see Proksch, Slapin and Thies (2011)), across time (e.g. manifestos
1But see Somer-Topcu (2013) for a recent exception.
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frequently increase in length over time), across parties that compete in the same election, and within
parties themselves (e.g. by using different agenda-setting procedures across elections). It is difficult to
determine ex post the actual procedure used to draft each manifesto, the number of party factions and
their preferences, the drafters’ intended audience(s), the various proposals under discussion, and the
number of iterations the manifesto draft actually went through. At one extreme, a small committee
composed of the party leadership may write the manifesto. At the other extreme, a party conference
may discuss various proposals and vote on an issue-by-issue basis on amendments. Irrespective of the
actual procedure used, multiple actors within the party are involved in the drafting process and there
are multiple audiences within the party to whom the policies in the manifesto may be addressed. Even
if we knew the exact procedure a party used, we would still need to connect the procedure to the
actual content of the drafted manifesto. Unfortunately, we do not have strong prior expectations that
a party elite-driven process would lead to systematically different manifestos than a party conference
approach — party leaders in a divided party may take internal party divisions into account when drafting
the manifesto even without directly consulting the larger party conference. Thus, party factions do not
necessarily have to be directly involved in the drafting process for the manifesto to represent the variation
of beliefs in the party.
Our approach seeks to map policy ambiguity into a text generation mechanism. We begin with the
simple assumption that a party can represent different positions using different textual statements. For
ease of exposition, we consider a party that wishes to connect with two different groups of voters —
groups A and B —, which the party believes to value different and possibly opposing messages. The
exact same logic, however, would apply when considering how a party might resolve differences between
competing factions within the party elite. While theoretically distinct, the observational implications of
our theory for these different scenarios are indistinguishable. Prior to an election, the party must decide
how to present the party message to both groups in the manifesto. Assume that on each policy issue i,
each position is represented by a textual statement Ti. Thus, the position of group A can be expressed
through statements TA1 and TA2, and the position of group B through TB1 and TB2.
2 The precise content
2Text statements expressing different policy positions are assumed to use different words. For the purposes of theoretical
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of the final manifesto depends on how the party decides to weigh the ideological differences among their
voters.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 lists numerous scenarios describing how the party may arrive at different versions of the
manifesto. First, one group may be dominant, and the party may simply decide to speak solely to this
group on both issues (scenarios 1 and 2). In another instance, one group may care more about one
policy issue, while the second group cares more about the other. In this scenario, the manifesto may
represents a log roll of the two groups’ positions (scenarios 3 and 4). We can also imagine alternative
scenarios in which the party reaches a compromise position that attempts to assuage both groups. In
one such scenario, the party may formulate an entirely new compromise platform (scenario 5). In other
compromise scenarios, the party may decide to include statements to speak to both groups (scenarios
6 to 10), or to remain silent on an issue entirely (scenarios 11 to 18). Thus, manifesto writers can
agree to a log roll, to a compromise position, to a partial compromise representing both positions, to
remain silent on some issues, or some combination of these approaches.3 We can contrast these scenarios
with the baseline case in which the party speaks to a unified base. In that case, the manifesto would
simply include two statements, one expressing the single agreed-upon first issue position, and a second
expressing the single agreed-upon second issue position.
Given the variety of ways that parties can aggregate positions, we expect that more ambiguity leads
to higher variance in the language used. In other words, relative to the baseline of internal agreement,
parties with multiple groups, audiences, or factions may choose to express ambiguous positions by
mentioning both positions on both issues, by remaining silent on one issue, or by agreeing to a (possibly
unclear) compromise position on both issues. Our aim is not to explain when and why parties choose
one of these strategies over another. In fact, this would only be possible if we knew the procedure that
parties chose for specific elections, and even then we would not know whether the proposals already
exposition, we also assume that there is no stochastic text generation process — factions expressing the same position
use the same words. We do not make this assumption in the empirical section.
3The list in table 1 is not exhaustive, but it includes the most important scenarios.
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reflect a scenario described above. Thus, we point out that ambiguity is likely linked to higher variance
in word usage. More formally, for manifestos of a given length, our expectation is that a party that
stakes out an ambiguous position will use ideologically discriminating words more frequently or less
frequently than a cohesive party.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The following example demonstrates the word usage patterns for parties with a clear message and
parties expressing more ambiguity. Imagine we have three parties with a clear message — a left-wing
party, a right-wing party, and a centrist party — and one centrist party with an ambiguous message.
The parties communicate positions by emphasizing words from the same political vocabulary — for
example “jobs”, “equal”, “taxes”, and “individual” — and all parties write manifestos of the same
length. We can represent these manifestos as term-document matrices, and Table 2 presents such a
hypothetical matrix. The left party A frequently includes words that emphasize its left-wing position
— “jobs” and “equal” — while the right party B frequently uses words associated with a right-wing
position — “taxes” and “individual”.4 In contrast, the cohesive centrist party C mentions words from
across the political spectrum in equal amounts. Party D with an ambiguous message, however, mentions
some words in a similar manner to the left party, some words in a similar manner to the right party,
and is silent on other words. Current methods would — correctly — place parties C and D in the center
of the political space, but they would not be able to distinguish the level of clarity between them. The
scaling model we propose below suggests that party D, while still expressing a centrist position, is more
ambiguous than party C.
4 A Model of Party Manifestos: Connecting Theory and Data
Our theoretical model of manifesto drafting suggests that we can learn about the clarity of a party’s
message, as well as position-taking, from word usage in manifestos. We develop a scaling model for
4We ascribe these words an ideological connotation for expository purposes only. In actual manifestos, these words may,
or may not, represent left- and right-wing positions. Their ideology would be determined through the estimation process.
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this purpose, taking the Slapin and Proksch (2008) Wordfish model as our starting point. We begin by
reviewing the Wordfish model.5 Let i (1 ≤ i ≤ I) indicate a party, and t be a time period (1 ≤ t ≤ T ).
The data come from the P = I ∗ T manifestos that each party produces in each separate time period,
and we attempt to recover ωit, the ideal point of each party i in time period t. Across all the manifestos,
let J represent the total number of unique words across all documents. The frequency that word j
appears in the manifesto of party i at time t is assumed to follow the Poisson distribution:
yijt ∼ Poisson(λijt) (1)
λijt = exp(αit + ψj + βj ∗ ωit) (2)
where yijt is the count of word j in the document of party i at time t, α is a set of actor fixed
effects, ψ a set of word fixed effects, and β a word-specific weight capturing the importance of word
j in discriminating between party positions. The Poisson distribution expresses the probability of a
number of events occurring in a fixed period of time conditional on a known average rate, but other
parameterizations of this model can also be chosen.
The negative binomial offers one such alternative parameterization. It is the probability distribution
associated with the number of successes in an independent sequence of Bernoulli trials before a specified
number of failures occur. The negative binomial distribution X ∼ NB(r, p) is characterized by two
parameters, the probability of success p and the predefined number of failures r. As r increases, a
Poisson distribution with expected value λ can be reparameterized as a negative binomial distribution
as follows:
Poisson(λ) = lim
r→∞
NB(r,
λ
λ+ r
) (3)
5The “bag of words” approach adopted by Wordfish and other text-as-data models assumes that words are conditionally
independent from one another, an assumption that never holds in real text as grammar matters. Nevertheless, “bag of
words” models tend to work in practice, and our validation approach explicitly tests the sensitivity of our results to these
assumptions.
8
This suggests that the Wordfish model described in equation (1) can also be rewritten as:
yijt ∼ NB(r, λijt
λijt + r
) (4)
for any sufficiently large value of r. Because a negative binomial distribution with parameters r and p
has mean µ = r(1−p)/p and variance σ2 = r(1−p)/p2 = µ+ 1
r
µ2, fixing r = 50 is generally sufficient for
the distribution to approximate the Poisson. However, equation (4) is not the final model we estimate.
Rather than estimating a single value of r or fixing it to a certain value, we instead allow it to vary
across documents. We therefore estimate the negative binomial scaling model
yijt ∼ NB(rit, λijt
λijt + rit
) (5)
Our central estimand of interest from (5) is the document parameter rit. Given the formula for
the variance of a negative binomial distribution, 1
rit
µ2 captures the amount of overdispersion for the
document of party i at time t relative to what one would expect from the Poisson distribution. For
ease of interpretation, we report θit =
1
rit
as the clarity parameter — as θit increases, overdispersion also
increases, which we substantively interpret as a decrease in ideological clarity (or increase in ambiguity).
After controlling for text length and position, the parameter captures situations in which parties logroll,
omit, or include conflictual statements, which lead to term-document matrices that omit, or contain
more words than would be the case if parties were perfectly clear. The model is estimated through
Markov Chain Monte Carlo.6 Like all scaling techniques, identification of αit, ψj, βj, and ωit is only
relative. We identify our model by constraining the first value of αit = 0 and the first value of βj
to what is estimated using the Poisson algorithm, though our results are not sensitive to the choice
of identifying restriction. Note also that all cohesion parameters θit are identified with no additional
identifying restrictions.
Our theory focuses on intra-party reasons for parties to remain vague or silent on issues, either
6Estimation is conducted in R using slice sampling, with a burnin of 1,000 iterations. Point estimates are taken as
posterior means of 5,000 draws.
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due to internal party divisions or strategic decisions to remain deliberately ambiguous. It is useful to
consider to what extent system-wide (rather than party-specific) reasons for vagueness or deliberate
silence would affect our measure. First, following from Riker’s Heresthetics (1986) and Budge et al’s
(2001) saliency theory, there may be issues that all parties are reluctant to discuss. An example of
such an issue in the U.S. would be Social Security reform, commonly referred to as the “third rail”
of American politics. For issues where silence/vagueness is universal across parties, words referring to
the issue will universally appear with 0 or very low counts. This will result in both small fixed effects
for the words, and small word discrimination parameters (ie. ψj ≈ 0 and βj ≈ 0), meaning silence
will have little to no effect on estimates of party positions or clarity estimates. Second, silence may
occur because of issue ownership advantages (see Petrocik, 1996). For example, it may be beneficial for
parties on the right to repeatedly mention “law and order” in their manifestos, but not for parties on
the left. To the extent that issue ownership is correlated with ideology, this will affect our positional
estimates by loading onto the word discrimination parameter βj. This in turn will help to produce
an “expected” number of word frequencies conditional on the position estimated, and heterogeneity
from the expected word frequency is interpreted in our model as heterogeneity in word usage that is
conditional on ideology.
5 Simulations and Text Coding Exercise
Before proceeding to substantive applications of our estimator, we test it in two ways. First, we apply
our estimator to term-document matrices generated from simulated political texts with different levels
of ambiguity, and show that our model captures these differences. Second, we present human coders
with manifestos generated according to our model of the data-generating process. Our coders correctly
perceive the relative levels of clarity in our documents, providing additional validation of the results
from our manifesto simulation.
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Manifesto Drafting Simulation
A standard testing procedure for scaling algorithms are Monte Carlo simulations, that allow researchers
to simulate data based on the true data-generating mechanism. In our case, this means the simulation of
term-document matrices where each word count is consistent with a negative binomial data generating
mechanism. Such a simulation reveals that our estimator is able to recover the true spatial configuration
of parties as well as their ideological clarity.7 At the same time, a Monte Carlo simulation as a diagnostic
tool is of limited use for our purposes. We know that natural language is complex and word counts are
not generated according to a simple probability distribution such as the negative binomial. Therefore,
a document scaling model should work, in particular, for term-document matrices from actual political
texts. Therefore, we conduct a manifesto drafting simulation and start by selecting eleven policy areas
likely to be covered by an actual party manifesto. We formulate generic statements on these areas in
English with regard to British politics, an arbitrary choice made for linguistic convenience only. The
topics cover a broad range of policy areas, including employment, the tradeoff between taxes and public
spending, environment, global warming, energy, defense, European Union and the Euro, immigration,
public health, crime, and education and families.
For each of these eleven policy areas, we draft three policy statements assuming that parties compete
on a single dimension. Thus, the first statement in each policy area always expresses a “left” position,
the second statement a “center” position, and the third statement a “right” position. Our goal in
drafting these statements is to compose sentences that adhere to natural language rules and reflect
policy positions that could realistically appear somewhere in a party’s manifesto. In formulating the
sentences, we follow three guiding principles: first, the statements should reflect the ability of parties
to freely choose which issues to emphasize; second, the sentences should reflect the fact that parties use
different words from the political lexicon to talk about similar issues;8 and third, the statements should
reflect that parties emphasize particular words to convey their message. By merging the ideologically
similar statements across policy areas, we can form three manifestos expressing clear positions that
7The appendix provides the details for this Monte Carlo simulation.
8We take as much vocabulary from actual British manifesto sentences as possible, and adjust it as necessary.
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reflect left leaning, centrist, and right leaning parties. All 33 statements are listed in the appendix.
Using our 33 policy statements, we can now simulate ideological clarity by creating additional man-
ifestos. We start with a centrist party that chooses to remain ambiguous by including left and right
statements in its manifesto. This lack of clarity could be due to intra-party divisions or for strategic
reasons. In the simulation, the party includes center statements on five of the eleven policy areas, left
statements on three, and right statements on the remaining three areas. The clear advantage of this
approach is that we know a priori that this manifesto should express a position that is less clear than
the previously generated three left, center, and right manifestos. To examine whether the scaling algo-
rithm is able to pick up different levels of clarity, we create additional manifestos that reflect a party
that is even more ambiguous. Thus, rather than choosing five center, three left and three right policy
categories for the manifesto, this party includes only one center statement, five statements on the right,
and five on the left. A priori, we expect that this manifesto should display more ambiguity as a result.
For each of the two simulated clarity levels, we generate ten manifestos, each time randomizing which
policy areas are expressed by the left, the center, or the right statement. Randomization guarantees
that the results do not depend on a particular combination of paragraphs.
In total, our manifesto drafting exercise yields 23 manifestos: three (clear) left, center, and right
manifestos, 10 manifestos with moderate ambiguity levels, and 10 manifestos with large ambiguity
levels. Each of these manifestos are independently “readable” in the sense that the grammar, syntax,
and style of all manifestos presented here are valid. We include an additional nine manifestos that span
the entire ideological space between the left and the right statements.9 In total, we estimate positions
and cohesion parameters for 32 manifestos and the estimates shown are posterior means of 5,000 draws
after a burn-in of 1,000 iterations.
9These anchoring manifestos do not come from texts, but are simply rounded linear interpolations of the left and right
manifestos for each word. For example, if the word “market” appeared once in the left manifesto but 11 times on the
right manifesto, the word “market” would appear (2, 3. . . 10) times in our 9 anchoring manifestos. These anchoring
manifestos make the ideological space appear more continuous, simulating the ideological distribution we might expect
in a multi-party democracy.
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1a shows the position estimates for the documents from the standard Wordfish model. As
expected, all manifestos with some level of ambiguity are estimated as centrist documents. Thus, if
we were simply to estimate positions while ignoring ideological clarity, we would be able to estimate
positions that are theoretically plausible, because these manifestos are a combination of center, left,
and right statements. Next, we jointly estimate positions and clarity using our new scaling model. As
expected, the positional estimates from our model correspond closely to those estimated using Wordfish,
correlating at r = 0.997. However, the crucial test is whether the algorithm also captures variation
in ideological clarity across the documents. Our baseline manifestos, which include the anchoring
documents and the three clear manifestos on the left, center, and right, should exhibit very low levels of
overdispersion, whereas the ten manifestos with medium levels of ambiguity should receive overdispersion
estimates that are higher, and the ten manifestos with high levels of ambiguity should have the largest
overdispersion parameters.
Figure 1b shows the estimated clarity levels for all documents. The left, center, and right docu-
ments all exhibit very high clarity (low ambiguity) levels , with θit varying between 0.008 and 0.0154,
largely consistent with the original Poisson distribution.10 The average clarity estimate for these three
documents is .011. In contrast, the five documents with moderate levels of ambiguity exhibit much
higher θit’s, with an average of .041, nearly four times higher than the average for the left, center,
and right manifestos. The 10 documents vary in the actual levels, but this is not surprising given the
stochastic nature of combining the statements across policy areas. Important for our purpose, however,
is the overall trend towards larger θit’s (more overdispersion) for more ambiguous manifestos. Note, in
particular, that the 10 most ambiguous manifestos have the 10 largest θit estimates. The average θit
for this set is .284, more than seven times higher than the average for manifestos with moderate levels
10While this is true, we emphasize that it is entirely possible that longer, but clear, manifestos may also be overdispersed.
Rather than focusing on absolute levels of dispersion, we instead concentrate on the relative differences between the
ambiguous versus the baseline documents.
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of clarity.11 Overall, the results from the manifesto drafting simulation are reassuring in demonstrating
that our algorithm correctly recovers substantive clarity differences between simulated manifestos.
Manifesto Coding Exercise
While the previous simulation shows that the estimator successfully detects differences in of simulated
intra-party disagreement, it provides limited insight into the extent to which the theoretical story of
manifesto drafting translates into perceptions. Do people actually view manifestos from parties with
ambiguous positions, simulated in accordance with our theoretical model, as expressing an unclear or
divided position? After all, our argument is that ambiguity is reflected in the texts, albeit in subtly. As
a test of the construct validity of our theoretical argument, we construct a manifesto coding exercise
with human coders along the same lines as the the drafting simulation. We select economic policy as
the policy area of interest and choose ten economic issues on which parties state a position. For each
issue, we construct three sentences expressing a left, a right, and a centrist position. Analogous to the
simulation, a manifesto is a combination of ten sentences that are selected from these three bins.12 We
construct two types of manifestos: those with low levels of intra-party disagreement (or ambiguity),
defined as six centrist sentences, two left sentences, and two right sentences; and those reflecting high
levels of intra-party disagreement (or ambiguity), consisting of two centrist, four left, and four right
sentences. Our expectation is that manifestos with higher simulated levels of disagreement are also
perceived by coders as such.
We created 25 pairwise comparisons of a low disagreement manifesto and a high disagreement man-
ifesto. Each time, we randomly selected sentences to construct the manifesto. Thus each of the 25
comparisons consists of a different set of constructed manifestos, but in each we juxtapose manifestos
11With 10 moderately and 10 highly ambiguous documents, we can make 100 pairwise comparisons for our estimator
between moderate and high ambiguity. In all 100 cases, our estimator correctly identifies the more ambiguous manifesto.
While these 100 comparisons cannot be used to calculate p-values because they are not independent, they speak to the
robustness of the results.
12The difference is that we limit ourselves here to one policy area and sentences instead of paragraphs. These choices
were made to keep the exercise manageable and not too time-consuming for respondents.
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with the same levels of clarity. The exercise was conducted online, and we invited 25 graduate students
and post-docs in political science at [REDACTED] to participate. First, we presented respondents with
an introduction:
“We are interested in how you perceive internal conflict within political parties. Suppose a
political party is preparing its manifesto for an upcoming election campaign. Two different
versions of the economic policy section of the manifesto are under consideration, as shown
below. Please read these two statements carefully.”
Respondents were then presented with two statements and asked to indicate which of the two
expressed more internal disagreement (the appendix presents one of these 25 pairwise comparisons as
it appeared in the actual online survey). Out of the 25 invited coders, we received 18 responses. Of
these 18 coders, 15 correctly identified the text statement with more internal disagreement (83%). The
probability that one would observe at least this many correct answers by chance alone is p = .0007.13
These results suggest that when we construct documents with a lack of clarity in line with our theoretical
model of manifesto drafting, human coders correctly perceive these documents as ambiguous. This
provides independent validation for our manifesto simulation from the previous section.
6 Manifesto Analysis
We conclude our analysis by applying our estimator to post-1990 election manifestos in Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland.14 We choose these countries for theoretical, empirical, and linguistic
13We calculate this p-value by examining the area under the binomial distribution when the underlying probability of
choosing the correct statement is .5. We also asked respondents to indicate the perceived level of difficulty for this
coding task on a scale from 1 (not difficult at all) to 3 (very difficult), and the average reported level was 2.1, suggesting
the coding task was feasible.
14The time periods are 1990-2005 for Germany (25 manifestos), 1992-2007 for Ireland (22 manifestos), 1994-2006 for
Netherlands (30 manifestos), and 1991-2006 for Sweden (34 manifestos). For Germany, we use the dataset from Slapin
and Proksch (2008) contained in the R package austin (Lowe, 2011). For the other countries, we keep all words that
appear at least once in each election. This results in a matrix of 1,955 words for Ireland, 910 words for Sweden, and
4,226 words for the Netherlands. Manifestos were downloaded from the Political Documents Archive (www.polidoc.net,
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reasons. Theoretically, our country selection is comprised of stable multiparty systems with a strong
tradition of manifesto writing. Empirically, they provide us with a sufficient number of documents
over a reasonably long time frame, and their manifestos are readily available in electronic format.
Linguistically, our case selection demonstrates that our automated technique works well on documents
written in four different languages. Our goal is threefold: we cross-validate the positional estimates for
the party manifestos with alternative measures, we wish to evaluate the clarity parameter in view of
relatively limited information available on clarity of party positions, and we want to demonstrate that
we can use information from our estimation for comparative analysis of party politics.
Cross-Validation
We first assess the validity of our position estimates, we correlate them with two commonly used sources
of data on party left-right ideology — the left-right (RILE) positions from the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP) (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006), and the general left-right dimension taken
from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey of party positions (Marks et al., 2007; Hooghe et al., 2010). We
find moderate to strong correlations across all four countries between our estimates and both extant
measures. The strong positive trends, shown in the appendix, suggest that our estimates succeed in
capturing the positional information in the manifestos. Positions estimated with the negative binomial
model correlate highly with the Wordfish positions, ranging between +.78 and +.96. The correlations
between the positions and the Manifesto left-right scale range between +.46 and +.87, and the average
correlation across the four countries is +.66. The positions also correlate equally well with an alternative
version of the Manifesto Project left-right scale, the logit transformed scale proposed by Lowe et al.
(2011). Lastly, the positions correlate highly with expert survey positions, as well. Correlations range
between +.57 and +.87, with an average of +.78 across the four countries.15 Taken together, the results
show that positional estimates are robust across countries and consistent with existing measures.
Benoit, Bra¨uninger and Debus, 2009).
15The Chapel Hill surveys were conducted in 1999, 2002, and 2006. We match election years to the closest survey year
and drop all elections prior to 1997.
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A similar validation exercise is not possible for the clarity parameter because alternative measures
are largely absent. Moreover, just as with any other scaling model, the estimates are not directly
comparable across models because identification is country and language specific (the same applies for
the positional estimates). One potential alternative approach to ideological clarity is to study possible
observational consequences. As the perceived ambiguity around a position increases, our estimated
clarity estimate should as well. We examine this supposition with uncertainty estimates generated from
the Chapel Hill expert surveys. The expert survey uncertainty estimates are the standard deviations of
the expert position scores on the left-right dimension.
Marks et al. (2007) and Hooghe et al. (2010) attempt to explain variation in expert assessments of
party positions, and find that the standard deviations of expert assessments of European integration
positions increase with internal party dissent on that dimension (as assessed by the experts). Of course,
clarity of stance is certainly not the only factor that explains expert standard deviations. The research
also finds that experts are better able to assess party positions for parties receiving more votes and
parties that are more ideologically extreme. Lastly, a large amount of the variance in the expert
placement standard deviations remains unexplained, suggesting that much of the variation may be
due to random noise. We run an OLS model similar to Hooghe et al. (2010), explaining the expert
standard deviations on the Chapel Hill Left-Right dimension as a function of our clarity (overdispersion)
parameter, vote share, and the absolute value of our estimated party ideology. Because the clarity and
party position estimates are not directly comparable across countries, we create dummies for these
two variables to avoid making comparisons on an interval scale. Extreme Position Dummy equals 1 if
the position estimate belongs to the 20 percent most extreme positions (absolute value of the position
estimate is greater than 1.2 standard deviations from the mean), while Ambiguity Dummy equals 1 if the
overdispersion parameter of that manifesto is greater than the mean overdispersion within the country.
In addition, we include country fixed effects. Based on the results reported by Hooghe et al. (2010), we
expect a positive sign on the cohesion dummy parameter, a negative sign on vote share, and a negative
sign on the extreme position dummy. The results are presented in table 3. As expected, ambiguity as
captured by the clarity parameter is positively associated with the expert survey standard deviations. In
17
addition, parties receiving higher vote shares have smaller standard deviations, but positional extremity
seems to correlate positively with expert standard deviations.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
As a final test, we compare our ideological clarity estimates for Ireland to an alternative manifesto-
based measure that we develop based on the policy dictionary created by Laver and Garry (2000).16
Based on a hierarchical manifesto coding scheme, the dictionary includes keywords for nine different
policy areas. Importantly, Laver and Garry assigned keywords to positive, negative, and – if possible
– neutral subcategories within each area. For instance, keywords for the economic policy area are
subdivided into the following three categories: (a) those expressing support for state intervention in
the economy, (b) those expressing opposition to state intervention, and (c) those expressing a neutral
stance regarding the level of state involvement.
Laver and Garry use keyword matches from the first two categories (pro or con state intervention) to
calculate economic policy positions, disregarding the matches for the neutral keywords. For a potential
validation with our clarity estimates, however, the occurrence of neutral keywords regarding the level of
state intervention may be particularly useful. If parties use these neutral keywords more frequently to
express more ambiguous positions, then we would expect that our clarity estimates correlate positively
with the occurrence of neutral keywords. To test this hypothesis, we first apply the economic policy
dictionary to Irish party manifestos. As a measure of ambiguity, we calculate the proportion of matches
in the neutral category out of all matches in the economic policy category. Applied to Irish manifestos,
this measure ranges from .35 to .60, with a mean of .45. In other words, on average 45 percent of
economic policy keywords mentioned in a manifesto are in the neutral category, and 55 percent are
either expressing a position pro or contra state intervention. Finally, we correlate this measure with
our clarity estimate. The proportion of neutral keywords correlates significantly at +.47 (t = 2.39,
16This dictionary was originally used to estimate policy preferences expressed in manifestos. Although it was developed
using British party manifestos, the authors demonstrate applicability to Irish party manifestos as well. We use their
dictionary as implemented in the content analysis software Yoshikoder (http://www.yoshikoder.org).
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p = 0.027) with our parameter estimate. In sum, the results lend support to the notion that our
estimate captures substantive information regarding ideological clarity.
Ideological Clarity and Electoral Success
We now use the clarity and position estimates in a model to explain parties’ electoral success. Little
work to date examines the effect of positional ambiguity on electoral success in multiparty democracies
(but see Somer-Topcu, 2013), and no work examines the effect of ambiguity using party elite level
data.17 Using our estimates, we investigate the interaction effect of party position shifts and changes
in ambiguity on electoral success. In line with previous research, we expect parties to pick up votes as
they move to the center (e.g. Ezrow, 2005; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Kalandrakis and Spirling,
2011). However, we also hypothesize that changes in ideological clarity may alter how position shifts
affect party vote share. In particular, parties are likely to find ambiguous positions more advantageous
as they moderate their ideological stance; they can reach out to a larger segment of the electorate at
the center of the political space. Conversely, parties moving to the extremes may win more votes as
they stake out clearer positions. At the extremes, there are fewer additional voters for parties to pick
up through broadening their ideological appeal. Rather, the relatively few extreme voters may view
ideological ambiguity as a sign of weakness, or insufficient commitment to their cause.18 This leads us
to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Parties gain votes when taking more moderate and more ambiguous posi-
tions.
Hypothesis 2: Parties gain votes when taking more extreme and less ambiguous positions.
To test these hypotheses, we use change in party vote share from the previous election as the
dependent variable. We use our estimates of ideology and clarity as our independent variables. As in
17Somer-Topcu (2013) takes a different approach to a similar question examining the effects of voters’ perceptions of party
position ambiguity.
18Although a somewhat different argument, our hypothesis is in line with the findings in the niche party literature that
niche parties are punished at the polls when they moderate their views (e.g. Adams et al., 2006).
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the previous regression model, we must ensure cross-national comparability. We cannot naively pool
our estimates in a statistical model as we do not know whether ideological distances and levels of clarity
of the same value mean the same thing in different countries. We solve this issue by transforming the
variables. The first variable Clarity change is a dummy coded 1 if the overdispersion estimate of a party
in election t is lower than the estimate for the same party in the previous election t − 1, and 0 if the
overdispersion estimate is higher (i.e. a party is more ambiguous than before). The second variable
Position change is a dummy indicating whether the party’s position is further from the center of the
political space in election t than in the previous election t − 1.19 To capture the conditional effect, we
also include the interaction of the clarity and position change dummies.
While the dummy variables solve the identification issue across countries, they do not allow us
to make any substantive comparisons regarding the magnitude of the effects. After all, parties may
not change position or clarity from one election to the next. To account for this possibility, we code
additional variables. Large position change is coded as −1 if a party’s position is more than one standard
deviation more moderate than before, +1 if it is more than one standard deviation more extreme, and 0
otherwise. Similarly, Large clarity change is coded as −1 if a party is more than one standard deviation
more ambiguous than before, +1 if it is more than one standard deviation less ambiguous, and 0 if there
is change. As a final alternative operationalization of parties’ ideological clarity change, we calculate
the variable Significant clarity change which takes into account the estimation uncertainty around the
overdispersion parameter. The variable is coded as +1 if a party manifesto was more clear than in the
previous election and the difference was statistically significant, as −1 if it was more ambiguous and that
change was statistically significant, and as 0 if there was no statistically significant change compared to
the previous election.
Table 4 presents the results. The sample size is N = 86 because we have to exclude the first election
in each country as we are unable to calculate the change variables. The models control for parties’
government status prior to the election t, as models of retrospective voting suggest that voters may
19To calculate the ideological center of the political space in each country, we weigh the estimated party positions by vote
shares.
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punish governing parties, party size using previous vote share, and country fixed effects. Models 1 and 2
show the effects for the dichotomous version of position change and clarity change, models 3 and 4 for the
(categorical) large position changes and significant clarity changes, and models 5 and 6 for large position
changes and large clarity changes. In each case, the second model includes country-fixed effects as a
robustness check. In all models, a party’s previous vote share has no effect, and our results are robust to
omitting this variable. The main findings for our variables of interest are robust across all specifications.
The independent effect of Position change is negative and statistically significant. Clarity change has
no statistically significant independent effect, but the interaction terms are consistently positive and
significant. To understand the substantive magnitude of these effects, we simulate various scenarios
below.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Mirroring the findings of Ezrow (2005) and Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), our results suggest
that moving away from the center of the space can be costly for parties. However, with our new
measure, we find that the effect is contingent upon changes in ideological clarity. Moving away from
the center hurts a party that has become more ambiguous, but it leads to gains for a party that has
become less ambiguous. These effects hold no matter what specification of position or clarity change we
use. For example, in the simplest model with the dichotomous measures (model 3), opposition parties
that make a move away from the center and become more ambiguous lose approximately 2.5% of their
vote share on average, while parties that move away from the center and become less ambiguous make
gains of around 2%. Moderating a position while becoming less ambiguous leads to vote share gains
of approximately 1.7%, while moderating and becoming more ambiguous leads to gains of over 2.5%.
These results are in line with other findings that extreme opposition parties are more likely to switch
to moderate preferences than to remain extreme (Kalandrakis and Spirling, 2011).20 And they suggest
that expressing a more ambiguous position in a manifesto may result in vote loss or gain, depending
20Kalandrakis and Spirling (2011) derive their result on the basis of a model that features two parties that alternate power
in a parliamentary system, and their empirical analysis uses data from single-party majority governments in Australia,
Greece, Malta, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom to estimate latent party preferences based on alternation patterns.
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on party positioning. Moreover, the results confirm that governing parties tend to be punished at the
polls.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Models that take into account large shifts in position and clarity lend even stronger support to our
findings (models 3 through 6). Table 5 shows the predicted vote share changes for various scenarios
based on the estimates from model 5. The predicted change in vote shares if a opposition party made
a large extreme shift and was substantively less ambiguous than before is +2.8. If the party makes the
same extreme shift but becomes more ambiguous in its position, the predicted change in vote share is
−3.8. This re-confirms the result that parties that move away from the center and take a clear position
tend to gain votes, but they lose votes if they become more ambiguous. The first difference of over 6
percent in vote shares is not only statistically significant, but substantively large. We can also use the
model to examine the effects of moderating a party’s stance. A significant moderate shift combined
with a significantly more ambiguous manifesto yields a +5.2 vote share change, the largest possible gain
in our simulation. This suggests that parties can win by broadening their appeal when adopting more
moderate positions. This is underscored by the fact that the same moderate shift with a less ambiguous
manifesto does not result in a statistically significant change in vote shares. Finally, we can compare
these predictions to those where parties do not change positions or clarity from one election to the next.
Here, a party is estimated to gain around +1.2 percent, primarily because it was in opposition prior to
the election and therefore tends to do better. Compared to this baseline, the potential vote losses and
gains implied by our model are quite substantive. Making more ambiguous policy statements possibly
leads to a larger vote share when parties can moderate positions, but also may lead to substantial losses
if a party fails to do both at the same time. In sum, this suggests that the success of moderating a
position is conditional on a party’s shift in ideological clarity that accompanies it.
In their model, parties are either dominated by moderates or extremists. Thus, while they acknowledge intra-party
heterogeneity, their model assumes that latent party positions themselves are not ambiguous. In addition for allowing this
possibility, our approach examines stated party positions in manifestos and levels of ambiguity of parties in multiparty
systems with government coalitions.
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7 Conclusion
To take full advantage of the information contained in election manifestos, we argue it is necessary
to consider the data-generating process underlying them. We propose a method that incorporates
substantive information about this process into a text scaling model. Based on theory, we derive a
scaling technique to estimate both ideological positions and clarity from manifestos. Previous methods
of extracting policy positions from political texts have largely ignored the fact that manifestos are
written by collective actors and aimed at multiple audiences. We demonstrate that our scaling procedure
captures party ideology and clarity in simulated data — both in Monte Carlo and in manifesto drafting
simulations. Furthermore, we corroborate the validity of the data-generating mechanism through an
online coding exercise. Finally, we apply our technique to manifestos in four multiparty democracies.
The results show that positions derived from the scaling model correlate with alternative manifesto-
based measures and that manifesto clarity measures correlate well with alternative conceptualizations
where available.
Lastly, we have used our estimates to explore how shifts in policy position interact with changes
in the clarity of the party message to affect a party’s electoral performance. While much has been
written about party positioning and electoral success in multiparty democracy, virtually nothing has
been written about ideological clarity and elections. We corroborate previous findings in the literature
that moving to the center of the space can lead a party to pick up votes, but we show that the impact
of clarity is highly contingent. Greater ambiguity can help parties as they move to the center, but it
may hurt them as they move to the extremes. This finding opens up avenues for further research. In
particular, we note that there is little research on why party ambiguity varies over time. In particular,
how do new party members, changes in issue salience, leadership changes, changes in electoral strategies,
appeals for coalition partners, and shifting voter preferences affect the clarity of a party’s message? And
in an environment where manifestos serve both as signals to the electorate and also to potential coalition
partners, to what extent are our answers to these questions conditioned by strategic considerations?
While our work does not provide answers to these questions, we believe we offer a promising first step
23
towards doing so.
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Table 1: Data Generating Process of Manifestos with Different Audiences
Scenario Manifesto Explanation
01. A is issue-by-issue median TA1 + TA2 A’s position on both issues enters the mani-
festo (dimension by dimension median).
02. B is issue-by-issue median TB1 + TB2 B’s position on both issues enters the mani-
festo.
03. Logroll AB TA1 + TB2 A’s policy on 1st issue, B’s policy on 2nd
issue
04. Logroll BA TB1 + TA2 B’s policy on 1st issue, A’s policy on 2nd
issue
05. Compromise α(TA1 + TB1) +
β(TA2 + TB2)
Policy compromise on pareto line, where 0 <
α, β < 1
06. Partial compromise ABA TA1 + TB1 + TA2 Inclusion of both statements on 1st issue, A’s
positions on 2nd issue.
07. Partial compromise ABB TA1 + TB1 + TB2 Inclusion of both statements on 1st issue, B’s
positions on 2nd issue.
08. Partial compromise AAB TA1 + TA2 + TB2 Inclusion of both statements on 2nd issue,
A’s positions on 1st issue.
09. Partial compromise BAB TB1 + TA2 + TB2 Inclusion of both statements on 2nd issue,
B’s positions on 1st issue.
10. No compromise ABAB TA1+TA2+TB1+
TB2
Inclusion of all statements on both issue.
11. Silent disagreement AB— TA1 + TB1 Inclusion of both positions on 1st issue, si-
lence on 2nd issue.
12. Silent disagreement —AB TA2 + TB2 Inclusion of both positions on 2nd issue, si-
lence on 1st issue.
13. Silent disagreement, compromise αTA1+(1−α)TB1 Compromise position on 1st issue., silence on
2nd issue.
14. Silent disagreement, compromise αTA2+(1−α)TB2 Compromise position on 2nd issue, silence
on 1st issue.
15. Silent disagreement, A dominant TA1 A’s position on 1st issue, silence on 2nd is-
sue.
16. Silent disagreement, A dominant TA2 A’s position 2nd issue, silence on 1st issue.
17. Silent disagreement, B dominant TB1 B’s position on 1st issue, silence on 2nd issue.
18. Silent disagreement, B dominant TB2 B’s position 2nd issue, silence on 1st issue.
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Table 2: Sample Word Count Matrix for 3 Parties with a clear position (A, B, and C) and
1 party with an ambiguous position (D)
Words Party A Party B Party C Party D
jobs 10 0 5 10
equal 10 0 5 0
...
...
...
...
...
taxes 0 10 5 10
individual 0 10 5 0
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Table 3: Explaining Expert Survey Standard Deviations with Ideological Clarity
Expert Survey
(OLS)
Ambiguity Dummy 0.146∗∗
(0.069)
Vote Share −0.005∗
(0.003)
Extreme Position Dummy 0.154∗
(0.084)
Ireland 0.127
(0.099)
Netherlands −0.228∗∗
(0.094)
Sweden −0.133
(0.100)
R-squared 0.279
adj. R-squared 0.224
N 74
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *p-value≤ 0.1, **p-value≤ .05, ***p-value≤ .01.
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Table 5: Effects of Positioning and Ideological Clarity on Parties’ Vote Shares
Less ambiguous No change More ambiguous
More +2.8 -0.6 -3.8
extreme (-0.4,+5.7) (-2.6,+1.2) (-6.9,-0.3)
No position +1.6 +1.2 +0.7
change (+0.0,+3.0) (+0.1,+2.2) (-0.9,+2.4)
More +0.5 +2.9 +5.2
moderate (-2.3,+3.2) (+1.2,+4.7) (+1.9,+8.5)
Note: Cell entries show simulated predicted vote share changes for a party that was previously in
opposition based on model 5. 95-% confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Manifesto Drafting Simulation
(a) Party Positions estimated with Wordfish
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(b) Ideological Clarity Estimates
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Supplementary Online Appendix
1
Appendix A. Monte Carlo Simulation
This section describes in more detail the results of the Monte Carlo simulation. To test the ability of
our estimator to correctly estimate our parameters of interest, we simulate a term-document matrix of
P = 25 manifestos and J = 1, 000 words consistent with a negative binomial data generating mechanism
outlined above. We draw our true parameter values from the following distributions: α ∼ U(0.6, 1.2),
β ∼ U(0.6, 2.1), ψ ∼ U(0.6, 1.2), ω ∼ U(0.1, 1.6), and θ = 1
r
∼ U(0.02, 0.5). Using the true values
of our parameter, we calculate λ for each word-document cell in our matrix and then draw from the
negative binomial distribution using the value of the document overdispersion. Estimates shown are are
posterior means of 5,000 draws after a burn-in of 1,000 iterations.
Our main parameters of interest are the manifesto positions ωit and the manifesto cohesion (overdis-
persion) parameter θit. The estimated positions correlate strongly with the true values at r = 0.996,
suggesting that we recover the true spatial configuration of the parties accurately. We obtain a Kendall’s
τc rank order correlation of 0.433. We examine recovery of the overdispersion parameters by plotting
the true θ against the recovered values with 95 percent Bayesian confidence intervals (see Figure 1). Our
results suggest that even with limited data, recovery of θ is quite good, with the 95 percent confidence
intervals covering the true parameter in 24 out of 25 documents. Our results also suggest that as the
true value of θ increases, our estimation uncertainy also increases. More specifically, the mean standard
error of θˆ is σθˆ = 0.009 in our simulation when the true θ < 0.2, but increases to σθˆ = 0.022 for θ > 0.33.
Note that while we can use Bayesian confidence intervals to check for correct coverage of our cohesion
parameter, comparing point estimates against one another visually is not possible because the estimates
are not independent. However, such comparisons can be made with the complete samples, which are
available upon request.
Substantively, we focus on the differences in θ across party manifestos, so testing our ability to
distinguish between different values of θˆ is of particular importance. We are especially concerned with
our probability of committing Type 1 errors, where the null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected when
it is true. This is especially problematic in light of problems introduced by multiple pairwise tests,
2
leading to familywise error rates that would normally exceed a naively specified value of α (Hochberg
and Tamhane 1987). We examine this issue by generating a term-document matrix from the same
distribution of parameters as before, but fix θ = 0.33 for all P = 25 documents. Note that this
allows us to test differences in r across
(
25
2
)
= 300 different document pairings in a situation where no
real difference in r exists. This is effectively Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference test in ANOVA,
excluding any corrections for experiment-wide error rates. Testing differences across estimates of θ at
the α = 0.05 level of significance, we find that 6 per cent of our 300 pairings produce differences in θ
that are statistically significant. Familywise error rates introduced by multiple comparisons therefore
do not appear to be substantively much larger than what we would expect from naively pre-specified
levels of α.
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Figure 2: True vs. Recovered Clarity Parameter
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Appendix B: Party Manifesto Statements used for Simulation
1. Jobs / Employment
• Left: “Workers have suffered too much with their lost jobs and low unemployment benefits. Creating skilled jobs,
getting workers off unemployment, and creating a job recovery should be the government’s top priorities. The
government will work towards reducing unemployment by creating millions of skilled jobs for British workers over
the next decade. Government must ensure that skilled jobs stay in Britain and that workers will not be unemployed
and on unemployment benefits. Unemployed workers should receive full benefits and the government should help
workers seek new employment and acquire new skills. Government should recover losses from any company that
puts workers’ employment at risk and prevents recovery. Only these policies will contribute to the recovery of the
economy, create skilled jobs, create more employment and reduce the unemployment rate, and prevent future job
loss. Government should simplify unemployment benefits and should allow unemployed workers to get into skilled
jobs and progress in their life. We are confident that we will see a swift recovery, return to full employment, with
more chances for workers to get on at their jobs. Transforming our country into a sustainable green economy will
create more jobs for skilled workers. The job guarantees will put an end to long-term unemployment and a life on
unemployment benefits. Our policy is to keep skilled jobs in Britain. As the economy recovers, we want to see
more employment and higher wages for Britain’s workers.”
• Right: “Government should foster growth by helping private business and industry generate wealth. Private
businesses and industries drive innovation to produce growth and wealth. Economic growth led by private business
and industry is the key to innovation, wealth, and success. The government should privatize industries and
businesses to generate wealth and grow the economy. Private industry and business are better than the state at
generating growth, sparking innovation, and creating wealth. Business and industry are the key to robust economic
growth, which lead to a wealthy society. The government should not interfere with private business as this hampers
growth and innovation. Private industry is the key to a healthy, innovative, and growing economy. Industry must
be allowed to innovate to bring generate new wealth throughout the economy. Without private businesses and
industry, innovation would stagnate. Private industry and business will lay the framework for future economic
growth and innovation. Innovation, sparked by private industry, generates wealth. Today’s private industry and
business generate wealth and growth for future generations.”
• Center: “Workers have suffered too much with their lost jobs and low unemployment benefits. Creating skilled
jobs, getting workers off unemployment, and creating a job recovery should be the governments top priorities. The
government will work towards reducing unemployment by creating millions of skilled jobs for British workers over
the next decade. Government must ensure that skilled jobs stay in Britain and that workers will not be unemployed
and on unemployment benefits. Unemployed workers should receive full benefits and the government should help
workers seek new employment and acquire new skills. Government should recover losses from any company that
puts workers’ employment at risk and prevents recovery. Government should foster growth by helping private
business and industry generate wealth. Private businesses and industries drive innovation to produce growth and
wealth. Economic growth led by private business and industry is the key to innovation, wealth, and success. The
government should privatize industries and businesses to generate wealth and grow the economy. Private industry
and business are better than the state at generating growth, sparking innovation, and creating wealth.”
2. Taxes / Spending
• Left: “In times of crisis, government needs to be creative. Nationalising some companies, at least for a short
time, can be good for the economy. We need to redistribute from top to bottom. Everybody needs to get a fair
and equal share of wealth in our country. Government should nationalise companies to pump money into the
economy and to promote fairness and equality. In times of economic stagnation, increased spending is needed
to ensure stability. The government has increased spending to nationalise banks to save the economy, and will
continue to nationalise companies as needed to create a fair and equal economy. Nationalisation ensures fairness
and equality. Nationalising companies requires increased government spending, but without increased spending, it
will be impossible to fairly and equally redistribute money to the neediest citizens. Nationalisation will help the
government meet its goal of a more fair and equitable distribution of resources among the population. Without
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redistribution, it is impossible to achieve a fair and equitable economy. Increased spending is required to provide
equal and fair access to government services.”
• Right: “We believe in giving more power to individuals. Empowering individuals means giving individuals more
responsibility. Government can act responsibly by reducing both individual tax and corporate tax rates to help
sustain the economy. More government money in the economy leads to higher inflation. Keeping prices and
inflation down and reducing the deficit should be the government’s top priority. Government must demonstrate
fiscal responsibility, tackle the budget deficit, prevent rising inflation, all while reducing taxes. It is possible to both
reduce corporate tax rates and individual tax rates, while stabilizing inflation and tackling the deficit. Reducing
the deficit and taming inflation, in addition to reducing individual and corporate taxes is the most responsible
course of action for the government to take. The government must promote fiscal responsibility by controlling
inflation and reducing the deficit, while leaving tax rates untouched. Without reducing taxes, the fiscal burden
borne by corporations and individuals is too high. Just as individuals must be responsible in their finances, the
government must demonstrate responsibility by reducing the deficit without increasing individual or corporate
taxes. Corporations and individuals already contribute a great deal to the economy. They should not be taxed
further to solve the deficit problem. Their taxes should be reduced.”
• Center: “Nationalisation ensures fairness and equality. Nationalising companies requires increased government
spending, but without increased spending, it will be impossible to fairly and equally redistribute money to the
neediest citizens. Nationalisation will help the government meet its goal of a more fair and equitable distribution of
resources among the population. Without redistribution, it is impossible to achieve a fair and equitable economy.
Increased spending is required to provide equal and fair access to government services. Reducing the deficit and
taming inflation, in addition to reducing individual and corporate taxes is the most responsible course of action for
the government to take. The government must promote fiscal responsibility by controlling inflation and reducing
the deficit, while leaving tax rates untouched. Without reducing taxes, the fiscal burden borne by corporations and
individuals is too high. Just as individuals must be responsible in their finances, the government must demonstrate
responsibility by reducing the deficit without increasing individual or corporate taxes. Corporations and individuals
already contribute a great deal to the economy. They should not be taxed further to solve the deficit problem.
Their taxes should be reduced.”
3. Environment
• Left: “We cannot sustain an economy without paying closer attention at our natural environment. Our environmen-
tal standards have been too low, we need to do more to make a transition towards a green and sustainable economy
that at the same time protects natural environment through strict regulations. Green action on environmental pro-
tection, sustainable economy, more environmental regulation is at the heart of policy-making. Government should
commit to protecting and enhancing our natural environment by regulating pollution, creating green standards,
and focusing on sustainable practices. Without a focus on sustainable practices, it will be impossible to protect our
natural environment. Government should create protected natural areas, develop green standards, and consider
sustainable practices when writing regulations. Government must promote sustainable practices by establishing
green regulations and standards. Government must introduce more environmental regulations to take charge of
environmental sustainability and to protect the natural environment. Sustainability is not possible without govern-
ment regulation and green standards. To protect the natural environment, government must ensure that tougher
green standards and regulations are met in both the public and private sectors. Investment in green technology
can help create sustainable jobs and protect the natural environment. Government should also support more reg-
ulation and protection of wildlife. Finally, we need more research on environmental protection and new ways for a
sustainable, green economy.”
• Right: “Conserving our tradition means understanding the importance of conservation. The conservation of our
lands is a priority but it should not hurt the economic development. This means less red tape and bureaucracy.
Businesses and individuals should take responsibility to conserve the environment while eliminating the bureaucratic
red tape that traditionally has hampered land development. Land conservation is necessary to ensure that space is
available for traditional outdoor activities, including hunting and fishing. It is possible to achieve land conservation
without bureaucratic red tape. Government should introduce a plan that enables neighbourhoods to specify
what kind of land development and conservation plans they want to see in their area without creating additional
bureaucratic red tape. Land conservation should aim to set aside space for traditional activities such as hunting
6
and fishing. Government intervention in the environment generates bureaucratic red tape that hampers land
development and undermines traditional practices. Traditional uses of land such as farming, hunting, and fishing,
must be preserved. Land development should not become mired in bureaucratic red tape. Land conservation policy
should conserve land for farming, hunting, and fishing. Bureaucratic red tape should not prevent development.
Land conservation is possible without bureaucratic red tape. Hunting is part of our tradition and culture, and our
conservation policies should seek to conserve tradition as well as land.”
• Center: “Government should create protected natural areas, develop green standards, and consider sustainable
practices when writing regulations. Government must promote sustainable practices by establishing green regula-
tions and standards. Government must introduce more environmental regulations to take charge of environmental
sustainability and to protect the natural environment. Sustainability is not possible without government regulation
and green standards. To protect the natural environment, government must ensure that tougher green standards
and regulations are met in both the public and private sectors. Investment in green technology can help create
sustainable jobs and protect the natural environment. Government should also support more regulation and pro-
tection of wildlife. Finally, we need more research on environmental protection and new ways for a sustainable,
green economy. Government intervention in the environment generates bureaucratic red tape that hampers land
development and undermines traditional practices. Traditional uses of land such as farming, hunting, and fishing,
must be preserved. Land development should not become mired in bureaucratic red tape. Land conservation policy
should conserve land for farming, hunting, and fishing. Bureaucratic red tape should not prevent development.
Land conservation is possible without bureaucratic red tape. Hunting is part of our tradition and culture, and our
conservation policies should seek to conserve tradition as well as land.”
4. Global Warming
• Left: “Global warming is here. Global warming is a threat and requires ambituous carbon emission cuts to prevent
melting of polar ice. This requires ambitious global cooperation. We have established an ambitious low carbon
policy to reduce global warming by controlling greenhouse gas emissions and encouraging use of emission free
vehicles. We must act quickly to prevent global warming by reducing carbon emissions. Preventing global warming
through ambitious programs to cut carbon emissions is necessary to protect the polar regions. Melting polar icecaps
endanger wildlife, such as polar bears and other vulnerable species. Ambitious low carbon emissions policies are
required to put an end global warming. Unless we reduce our carbon output, by reducing emissions from cars and
factories, global warming will continue to threaten the polar regions. Melting polar icecaps threaten to raise sea
levels, endangering coastal communities and wildlife. Ambitious low carbon policies are needed to prevent global
warming from endangering vulnerable species such as polar bears. Individuals and industry must embrace controls
on carbon output in order to reverse the trends in global warming. Ambitious low carbon cutting policies are
needed to reduce the effects of emissions on the planet. Being ambitious now may reduce global emissions and lead
to a transition of an economy free of harmful carbon use.”
• Right: “These are uncertain times. Government must fund research to scientifically investigate the still uncertain
causes of climate change. More scientific research is needed to determine whether our planet’s climate is, indeed,
changing as the result of human activity. Pollution may cause climate change, but scientific research on this is
uncertain. Our government will not implement ineffective policies aimed at reducing climate change when we are
uncertain whether it is caused by human activity. We will remain uncertain about the causes and degree of climate
change without more scientific research. Government policies regarding climate change will be ineffective unless
it is based on sound scientific research aimed at reducing uncertainty and uncovering the root causes of climate
change. Ineffective policies aimed at ending climate change cause a waste of taxpayer money. We will not spend
money on ineffective policies regarding the changing climate, especially those unsubstantiated by scientific research.
Scientific research has yet to produce a definitive answer regarding the relationship between human activity and
the causes of climate change. Climate change may be occurring but we are uncertain of its causes. Until scientific
research fully explores the causes of climate change, attempts to implement policies to end climate change will be
ineffective.”
• Center: “Ambitious low carbon emissions policies are required to put an end global warming. Unless we reduce our
carbon output, by reducing emissions from cars and factories, global warming will continue to threaten the polar
regions. Melting polar icecaps threaten to raise sea levels, endangering coastal communities and wildlife. Ambitious
low carbon policies are needed to prevent global warming from endangering vulnerable species such as polar bears.
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Individuals and industry must embrace controls on carbon output in order to reverse the trends in global warming.
Ambitious low carbon cutting policies are needed to reduce the effects of emissions on the planet. Being ambitious
now may reduce global emissions and lead to a transition of an economy free of harmful carbon use. Ineffective
policies aimed at ending climate change cause a waste of taxpayer money. We will not spend money on ineffective
policies regarding the changing climate, especially those unsubstantiated by scientific research. Scientific research
has yet to produce a definitive answer regarding the relationship between human activity and the causes of climate
change. Climate change may be occurring but we are uncertain of its causes. Until scientific research fully explores
the causes of climate change, attempts to implement policies to end climate change will be ineffective.”
5. Energy
• Left: “The transformation to a clean, alternative energy supply including renewable energies such as wind and solar
power is an investment into the future. Government must thus invest now in alternative, renewable, and clean
sources of energy. We need to increase energy from renewables like wind and solar by a lot. This includes solar,
wind and geothermal power. By tapping alternative, renewable energy sources (e.g. wind, solar and geothermal
power) the government will invest in the future of our country by providing new sources of clean energy. Wind,
solar, and geothermal energy are renewable, alternative energy sources for cleanly powering and heating our homes
and buildings. Investing in renewable, alternative energy - such as wind and solar power - is an essential investment
in the future of our country. Investment in clean sources of renewable energy will help ensure we have a clean air to
breathe in the future, and will ensure a clean environment. Greater investment in clean, renewable energy sources
will reduce the cost of alternative energy from wind and solar power. Clean, renewable energy is not cheap. But
it is an investment for the country without alternative.”
• Right: “We must continue to search for new sources of energy to reduce our dependence on foreign oil and gas,
while trying to maintain price stability. We must look for other sources of power such as nuclear energy, nuclear
fusion, and coal that we can produce at home. For the meantime, conventional coal and clean coal power is needed.
This is true for our use of oil and natural gas. Nuclear power is dependable and cheap and keeps energy prices
down. Nuclear fusion comes at a price, but holds great potential. Our dependence on oil and gas will make it very
difficult to wean our nation off of foreign sources of oil without seeing drastic price increases. Government must
consider all possible energy sources including coal, nuclear power and nuclear fusion, oil and gas, in an effort to
keep energy prices affordable. As the price of oil and gas continues to rise, energy sources such as nuclear and coal
become more attractive. We need to subsidize national energy production of nuclear energy that can reduce our
dependence on oil and gas and create stable prices. Nuclear fusion may one day solve our energy demands at low
prices and do away with our dependence on oil, gas, and coal for good. At the same time, we need to pay the price
for keeping nuclear power stations safe.”
• Center: “The transformation to a clean, alternative energy supply including renewable energies such as wind and
solar power is an investment into the future. Government must thus invest now in alternative, renewable, and clean
sources of energy. We need to increase energy from renewables like wind and solar by a lot. This includes solar,
wind and geothermal power. By tapping alternative, renewable energy sources (e.g. wind, solar and geothermal
power) the government will invest in the future of our country by providing new sources of clean energy. As the
price of oil and gas continues to rise, energy sources such as nuclear and coal become more attractive. We need to
subsidize national energy production of nuclear energy that can reduce our dependence on oil and gas and create
stable prices. Nuclear fusion may one day solve our energy demands at low prices and do away with our dependence
on oil, gas, and coal for good. At the same time, we need to pay the price for keeping nuclear power stations safe.”
6. Defense
• Left: “Peace is at the heart of our defense policy. Peace can only be achieved by operating through multilateral
channels, such as the UNO, and by concluding international treaties in close cooperation with our allies. It is our
declared goal to operate through multilateral institutions such as the UNO to promote peace. Multilateral treaties
can contribute to more disarmament than ever before, getting rid of some of the most dangerous weapons. A
new round of multilateral disarmament talks is neccessary to work towards peace. We must increase multilateral
involvement with our allies in the UNO, and lead the effort to create new multilateral UNO treaties in order to
promote global peace through disarmament. Disarmament of the most dangerous weapons is essential to preserve
long-lasting peace. Peace can only happen through the multilateral institutions of the UNO working towards
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disarmament. By working with our allies through the multilateral channels of the UNO, we can replace our troops
operating globally with UNO peacekeepers. We are for more multilateral action in the UNO security council. To
defend our country, we must seek to work with our allies through multilateral treaties and organizations, like the
UNO, to secure peace. Through multilateral forums such as the UNO, we can pursue goals such as disarmament
and peace. We need to do more for our veterans who fought so hard to preserve peace. Our allies have shown
how to remunerate veterans and we need to do the same here. Veterans do a great service to this country. The
sacrifices made by our veterans to ensure peace cannot go unrecognized. Veterans deserve our greatest respect. We
must support our veterans.”
• Right: “We have huge regard for our soliders and their contribution to our national defense. To defend our
national interests, we must defend ourselves against terrorist threats. We must do everything we can to deter
terrorist attacks. We must defend ourselves against the terrorists; the Terrorists cannot win. We must develop
strong national defenses to deter our enemies. The threat of a terrorist attack against our nation is high. We must
develop adequate defenses against such attacks. The deterent effect of our national defense forces with its many
soldiers should be strengthened. Terrorist attacks are stopped by a strong national defense and soldiers who do
their job when it is most needed. Government must take the terrorist threat more seriously than ever before. We
need to make the national defense forces more attractive for new soldiers. Soldiers protect and defend our nation.
Being a soldier is a national duty. Soldiers should be paid better and have better career possibilities than before.
We cannot and will not abandon our soldiers, who defend this nation. Support for our soldiers is necessary to
ensure the defense of our nation and national interests against the threat of terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks
represent the greatest threat to our way of life today.”
• Center: “Peace is at the heart of our defense policy. Peace can only be achieved by operating through multilateral
channels, such as the UNO, and by concluding international treaties in close cooperation with our allies. It is our
declared goal to operate through multilateral institutions such as the UNO to promote peace. Multilateral treaties
can contribute to more disarmament than ever before, getting rid of some of the most dangerous weapons. A
new round of multilateral disarmament talks is neccessary to work towards peace. We must increase multilateral
involvement with our allies in the UNO, and lead the effort to create new multilateral UNO treaties in order to
promote global peace through disarmament. Government must take the terrorist threat more seriously than ever
before. We need to make the national defense forces more attractive for new soldiers. Soldiers protect and defend
our nation. Being a soldier is a national duty. Soldiers should be paid better and have better career possibilities
than before. We cannot and will not abandon our soldiers, who defend this nation. Support for our soldiers is
necessary to ensure the defense of our nation and national interests against the threat of terrorist attacks. Terrorist
attacks represent the greatest threat to our way of life today.”
7. European Union and Euro
• Left: “Support for deeper European integration and more European trade should be a cornerstone of British foreign
policy. Support for the Euro and the European constitution are key for trade promotion across the continent.
Britain should purse deeper integration through the European Union by joining the Euro. Deeper European
integration promotes democracy and stability across Europe by increasing trade ties among member states. Deeper
European integration will lead to increased trade with continental Europe. The government should support efforts
to strengthen supranational actors and implement the EU constitution. This will create deeper integration. The
government should look into adopting the Euro as soon as possible. It is in the long term interest to be part of
the Euro. By joining the Euro and supporting a new European constitution, the government will promote both
trade and deeper cooperation with Europe. The Euro and the constitution are important symbols of European
integration. European countries are the most important trading partners.”
• Right: “Britian must protect its independence and sovereignty and should not cede authority to Brussels without a
referendum. We will veto any attempts to give Brussels more power. Britian should keep the pound. Any decision
to drop the pound must be put to a referendum. The government must protect its independence and sovereignty
by maintaining its right to veto any important policies decided in Brussels. The government must maintain a veto
over sensitive issues and should reserve the right to withdraw from policy areas when Brussels pushes policy too
far. Brussels cannot be allowed to threathen our sovereignty and independence. Britian should keep the pound
and put to a referendum any further transfer of authority to Brussels. The British people must have a veto over
the decision to give up the pound. The pound is a key symbol of our sovereignty and independence. Brussels
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will not be allowed to take the pound away from us. A referendum must be held on any decision to drop the
pound. Brussels cannot be allowed to impose laws on the British citizens against their will. The government must
retain the ability to veto policy from Brussels. Without the ability to veto policy made in Brussels, the British
government has effectively ceded sovereignty to Brussels.”
• Center: “Support for deeper European integration and more European trade should be a cornerstone of British
foreign policy. Support for the Euro and the European constitution are key for trade promotion across the continent.
Britain should purse deeper integration through the European Union by joining the Euro. Deeper European
integration promotes democracy and stability across Europe by increasing trade ties among member states. Deeper
European integration will lead to increased trade with continental Europe. A referendum must be held on any
decision to drop the pound. Brussels cannot be allowed to impose laws on the British citizens against their will.
The government must retain the ability to veto policy from Brussels. Without the ability to veto policy made in
Brussels, the British government has effectively ceded sovereignty to Brussels.”
8. Immigration
• Left: “Minorities without citizenship face some of the hardest challenges in our country. Our goal, however, is a
multicultural society where minorities feel like every other citizen. The government must offer migrants who come
to our country a legitimate chance at asylum and citizenship. Government policies must promote multicultural
awareness and minority rights. Minority groups and migrants contribute to our multicultural heritage. The
responsibility of government is not just to its own population, but to those migrants who are on a path to citizenship.
Migrants from other continents who seek asylum must be given opportunities in our multicultural society. Migrants
who are successful asylum seekers need to receive citizenship. In a multicultural society, migrant and minority rights
must be protected. We have a multicultural outlook on society. Minorities and migrants are key to our multicultural
society. Minorities offer new and different perspectives and points of view. Migrants and minorities are part of
our multicultural heritage. A clear path to citizenship is needed to protect the rights of asylum seekers. Asylum
seekers must be protected. Asylum seekers need a direct path to citizenship. Multiculturalism is an important part
of our society.”
• Right: “The government must regain control of our borders, make sure that immigrants assimilate to our customs,
and place limits on visas. Immigrants to Britian from elsewhere must learn our language and assimilate into British
culture. Too often immigrants abuse the rights and priviledges granted to them. There is a limit how much the
country can take. We must place limits on the number of visas issued to immigrants, and work to secure our
borders. Refusing to set visa limits on new immigrants is irresponsible policy. Within our borders, immigrants
must speak our language. We cannot continue to hand out visas to immigrants who do not learn our language, do
not assimilate, and who abuse our visa system. Limits on the number of immigrant visas are necessary to protect
our society, and language requirement should be part of the visa system. Immigrants who assimilate into our
culture are welcome, but we must not allow immigrants to abuse the system and cross the border. To contribute
to our society, immigrants must learn our language and assimilate into our culture. Increased border controls are
necessary to eliminate abuse of the visa system. We must not allow immigrants to cross our border illegally.”
• Center: “Minorities without citizenship face some of the hardest challenges in our country. Our goal, however, is a
multicultural society where minorities feel like every other citizen. The government must offer migrants who come
to our country a legitimate chance at asylum and citizenship. Government policies must promote multicultural
awareness and minority rights. Minority groups and migrants contribute to our multicultural heritage. The
responsibility of government is not just to its own population, but to those migrants who are on a path to citizenship.
Migrants from other continents who seek asylum must be given opportunities in our multicultural society. Limits
on the number of immigrant visas are necessary to protect our society, and language requirement should be part
of the visa system. Immigrants who assimilate into our culture are welcome, but we must not allow immigrants
to abuse the system and cross the border. To contribute to our society, immigrants must learn our language and
assimilate into our culture. Increased border controls are necessary to eliminate abuse of the visa system.”
9. Public Health
• Left: “The government must guarantee public access to affordable healthcare through the NHS. Patients must have
access to the affordable public healthcare that only the NHS can provide. The NHS and its staff, in particular its
nurses, provide a valuable public service to patients. Access to affordable public healthcare through the NHS must
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remain the cornerstone of government healthcare policy. Patients must come first in the government’s healthcare
policy. The NHS has many committed nurses, dedicated to patient care. NHS nurses must be paid a decent
wage. Nurses earning a decent wage can focus on patient care and provide a better public service. Public access
to professional nurses is an integral part of affordable healthcare. The NHS is committed to providing affordable
public healthcare, which all citizens can access. The government must support the NHS in its pursuit to provide
access to affordable public healthcare.”
• Right: “Money in the health care system is wasted. People need to have a choice again to get the best doctors
and the most effective medicine. We must reform our healthcare system to avoid waste, lower costs, and provide
individuals with greater choice. Under our current system, doctors waste too much time on with red tape and
cannot spend enough time practicing medicine. We will reform the system and transfer resources to support doctors
and improve medicine. Reform is necessary to increase choice within the healthcare system. Doctors must be free
to practice medicine as they see fit without worrying about wasteful government programs. Patients must be given
a choice of doctors they are able to visit. The government must make an effort to keep the cost of healthcare
under control without limiting patient choice. Reforms must reduce waste and excess costs, while giving doctors
the freedom to practice medicine as they see fit.”
• Center: “The government must guarantee public access to affordable healthcare through the NHS. Patients must
have access to the affordable public healthcare that only the NHS can provide. The NHS and its staff, in particular
its nurses, provide a valuable public service to patients. Access to affordable public healthcare through the NHS
must remain the cornerstone of government healthcare policy. Patients must come first in the government’s health-
care policy. The NHS has many committed nurses, dedicated to patient care. Patients must be given a choice of
doctors they are able to visit. The government must make an effort to keep the cost of healthcare under control
without limiting patient choice. Reforms must reduce waste and excess costs, while giving doctors the freedom to
practice medicine as they see fit.”
10. Crime
• Left: “We are proud of our record on civil liberties, protection of freedom, and privacy. The role of the government
is to protect citizens’ civil liberties and freedom. Government must also protect citizens’ privacy while seeking
justice. Bankers are responsible for reducing confidence in the justice of our system. They behavior is not civil.
Bankers must be brought to justice. Bankers’ criminal behavior has undermined our trust in liberties and freedom.
Learing the lessons means bringing more bankers than ever before to justice. They do not have the freedom to do
whatever they please. We need a return to civility. We need to protect the privacy of our citizens. Privacy is a
basic civil liberty. The government must protect individual privacy and civil liberties. Government must protect
freedom, basic civil liberties, and individual privacy in any democratic society. Without strong protections for civil
liberties, true freedom is not possible.”
• Right: “The crime rate is rising. Illegals threaten this country. Our prisons are full. Law and order is not upheld.
We will change that. We will prosecute crime and ensure the law is upheld. Those who break the law and commit
crimes and other illegal acts will be prosecuted and sent to prison. To create an orderly society, we must uphold the
law and prosecute criminals who break the law. Anyone who breaks the law three times will be sentenced to prison
for good. Illegals in this country will be prosecuted and law and order will be upheld. Illegal immigrants need to
be sent to prison for a longer time if their are serious criminals. The state must prosecute crime more quickly than
today and must build new prisons to send criminals to. Prisons must receive adequate funding. The government
must enforce the law. The government should not tolerate any form of illegal activity. All illegal activity will be
prosecuted, and the law will be upheld. The most serious of prosecuted illegal criminals need to be deported once
they serve their time in prison.”
• Center: “We are proud of our record on civil liberties, protection of freedom, and privacy. The role of the
government is to protect citizens’ civil liberties and freedom. Government must also protect citizens’ privacy while
seeking justice. Bankers are responsible for reducing confidence in the justice of our system. They behavior is not
civil. Bankers must be brought to justice. Bankers’ criminal behavior has undermined our trust in liberties and
freedom. The state must prosecute crime more quickly than today and must build new prisons to send criminals
to. Prisons must receive adequate funding. The government must enforce the law. The government should not
tolerate any form of illegal activity. All illegal activity will be prosecuted, and the law will be upheld. The most
serious of prosecuted illegal criminals need to be deported once they serve their time in prison.”
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11. Education and Family
• Left: “We want prosperity and social mobility for all. We will ensure that all children have the chance to move up
the social mobility ladder and reach prosperity through education. Education is absolutely essential for ensuring
childrens’ future social mobility. Children, regardless of their background should be entitled to a good education.
Unless all children are provided with a good education, our future prosperity will be placed in jeopardy. Children,
the most vulnerable people in society, must be protected. Children in vulnerable situations must be given access to
quality education. A quality education is a child’s best ticket to social mobility and future prosperity. We cannot
deny vulnerable children the chance at a good education. Without ample opportunities for social mobility through
education, vulnerable children will never have the opportunity to experience prosperity. Government must do all
it can to support vulnerable women and children and provide them with opportunties for education. Supporting
vulnerable women and children will increase childrens’ chances at social mobility. All barriers to social mobility
need to be tackled by giving the most vulnerable children free access to education. Education is fundamental to
prosperity.”
• Right: “We will safeguard the real values of our community, including marriage, family, community, and parental
control. Family is the core structure of our society. Government needs to encourage the family by introducing
marriage allowance, which increases when couples are parents. Marriage takes a valuable place and is congruent
with our family values. Parents face hard times. We must reduce fees that penalise parents, families and married
couples. Society needs more community-based values and less fees that are a burden on families. Parents need to
be in control over their families, not the government. The government must strive to build a strong community
in which parents feel comfortable raising a family. The government must pursue more and more policies that
strengthen community and family values and reduce the fee burden. Marriage forms the cornerstone of a healthy
family. Parents must play a role in building strong community schools. Family values based upon marriage underpin
our entire society. Parents must instill family values in their children. Communities built around strong family
values are essential. Young people will be required to take courses in summer during which they will work in the
community. These courses would instill community values in everyone. Parents want to see that traditional values
play a large role. Young people need to be community leaders so that they can follow their parents and eventually
be able to enter marriage and found their own family, all while being good community citizens.”
• Center: “We want prosperity and social mobility for all. We will ensure that all children have the chance to
move up the social mobility ladder and reach prosperity through education. Education is absolutely essential
for ensuring childrens’ future social mobility. Children, regardless of their background should be entitled to a
good education. Unless all children are provided with a good education, our future prosperity will be placed in
jeopardy. Children, the most vulnerable people in society, must be protected. arents must instill family values in
their children. Communities built around strong family values are essential. Young people will be required to take
courses in summer during which they will work in the community. These courses would instill community values
in everyone. Parents want to see that traditional values play a large role. Young people need to be community
leaders so that they can follow their parents and eventually be able to enter marriage and found their own family,
all while being good community citizens.”
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Appendix C. Sample Screen from Manifesto Online
Coding Measurement Exercise
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Appendix D. Correlations of Position Estimates
C-Wordfish vs. C-Wordfish C-Wordfish vs. C-Wordfish vs.
Original vs. RILE LogRILE Chapel Hill
(1990–2007) (1990–2007) (1990–2007) (1997–2007)
Germany +.96 +.82 +.82 +.87
Ireland +.95 +.46 +.49 +.85
Netherlands +.92 +.48 +.50 +.83
Sweden +.78 +.87 +.81 +.57
Note: Original = Poisson Wordfish, C-Wordfish = (Negative Binomial) Cohesion-Wordfish, RILE = Manifesto Project
Left-Right scale (Klingemann et al. 2006), LogRILE = Manifesto Project Logit Left-Right Scale (Lowe et al. 2011).
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Appendix E. Manifesto Clarity Estimates in Four Countries
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Appendix F. Correlation of Irish Clarity Estimates with Alternative Measure Based on
the Laver and Garry Policy Dictionary
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